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violsvaIt's very weird reading someone earnestly arguing for a principle which is the basic foundation of nearly all modern ethics. Or at least my own ethics. It's very hard to look at it from the point of view of someone who isn't convinced.
Mill mentions the various popular meanings of the words utilitarian and utility in his time; an interesting point is that something which is in the modern sense "utilitarian" - something which does nothing except perform a function - is less utilitarian in the philosophical sense than something which performs that function and is also beautiful - because the latter produces happiness in someone looking at it. Usefullness comes in various forms.
He also mentions Epicurius, and Epicurius said that artistic enjoyment was one of the only pleasures which had no associated pain. (The argument Mill's making is that Epicurianism/utility/happiness is not just about physical pleasure and excess, and that intellectual pleasures are, in fact, more fun. Or at least promote more happiness in general, especially to others.)
However, I'm reminded of Virginia Woolf saying "A good dinner is of great importance to good talk. One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined well," in A Room of One's Own. In order to be able to enjoy intellectual pleasures you need to have a relatively enjoyable physical baseline. Which ties in with Mill's point that (in utilitarianism) asceticism and sacrifice have no moral value unless they are for the sake of someone else's happiness.
I wrote that first paragraph when a bit more than halfway through; in the last chapter, however, talking about justice, he uses taxation as an example: "This doctrine [a poll tax], as applied to taxation, finds no advocates because it conflicts so strongly with man's feelings of humanity and social expediency." Tell that to Margaret Thatcher.
And of course it may or may not be considered an example of "modern ethics," but the recent election has indicated that there are lots of people who don't actually give a shit about the common good. Humans are complicated.
And that's a sort of general pessimism brought on by the circumstances, not actually my considered position. Mill points out that in fact we know that most people do mostly behave justly, because if they didn't we couldn't have a society at all: if people couldn't be trusted not to harm each other then we would all consider everyone potential enemies and guard against them (which I've just realized is how cats treat each other). I don't know if this is an argument that human nature is inherently good or that humans will usually live up to social expectations.
Mill mentions the various popular meanings of the words utilitarian and utility in his time; an interesting point is that something which is in the modern sense "utilitarian" - something which does nothing except perform a function - is less utilitarian in the philosophical sense than something which performs that function and is also beautiful - because the latter produces happiness in someone looking at it. Usefullness comes in various forms.
He also mentions Epicurius, and Epicurius said that artistic enjoyment was one of the only pleasures which had no associated pain. (The argument Mill's making is that Epicurianism/utility/happiness is not just about physical pleasure and excess, and that intellectual pleasures are, in fact, more fun. Or at least promote more happiness in general, especially to others.)
However, I'm reminded of Virginia Woolf saying "A good dinner is of great importance to good talk. One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined well," in A Room of One's Own. In order to be able to enjoy intellectual pleasures you need to have a relatively enjoyable physical baseline. Which ties in with Mill's point that (in utilitarianism) asceticism and sacrifice have no moral value unless they are for the sake of someone else's happiness.
I wrote that first paragraph when a bit more than halfway through; in the last chapter, however, talking about justice, he uses taxation as an example: "This doctrine [a poll tax], as applied to taxation, finds no advocates because it conflicts so strongly with man's feelings of humanity and social expediency." Tell that to Margaret Thatcher.
And of course it may or may not be considered an example of "modern ethics," but the recent election has indicated that there are lots of people who don't actually give a shit about the common good. Humans are complicated.
And that's a sort of general pessimism brought on by the circumstances, not actually my considered position. Mill points out that in fact we know that most people do mostly behave justly, because if they didn't we couldn't have a society at all: if people couldn't be trusted not to harm each other then we would all consider everyone potential enemies and guard against them (which I've just realized is how cats treat each other). I don't know if this is an argument that human nature is inherently good or that humans will usually live up to social expectations.